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Let me begin by noting a double blank in the papers collected in this 
volume: none of the authors has discussed the avowed bad reputation of 
money-lending at interest that we find in literary texts, and none have 
analysed the informal credit facilities available between friends and family. 
This is remarkable because both were long regarded as important and 
typical features of ancient credit systems1. Dominic Rathbone briefly 
mentions them in passing only to question and reject them as being of little 
importance.  
In a sense this is a pity, because personal networks were undoubtedly a 
powerful asset to obtain loans, either directly from close relations or 
indirectly through their influence and the security they offered. Solvency, 
prestige and moral credibility remained firmly interlinked throughout 
Roman history, from the Republic to Late Antiquity. Peter Temin hints at 
similar mechanisms in 18th c. England. However, the choice of the authors 
is also a sign of the times. The market economy is back in the heart of 
ancient economic history and so the dominant approach in these papers 
looks at credit markets, their institutions, organisations, actors and how 
they operated. 
In due course, we will have to re-examine the financial system as a 
whole, rather than focus on its many facets and subsections. The role of 
social networks and ideology will then no doubt re-emerge. For the 
moment, however, too many parts of the system (the role of endowments 
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for instance) have only recently received attention. Too many questions 
remain and details need filling in. 
The (relatively) recent discovery of important new data on ancient credit 
systems too requires more work. Many of the Roman papers in this book 
testify to the profound impact of Camodeca’s new edition of the tablets of 
the Agro Murecine. A re-edition of the Herculanean tablets by the same 
author is expected soon, which may well add more data to the fuel the 
debate. 
The straightforward condemnation of money-lending at interest, 
common among elite authors, is in patent contradiction to the ubiquity, 
complexity and flexibility of interest bearing credit attested in all types of 
primary sources. Jean Andreau’s analysis of the Latin terminology to 
denote interest shows that there was no negative connotation attached even 
to fenus, the oldest Latin word for interest. The further evolution of the 
terminology shows that interest was seen as the ‘price’ paid in exchange 
for the service provided by the lender when he allowed the debtor to use 
his money. If so, the condemnation of money-lending is an ideological 
construct, premised on old Greek ‘classical’ thinking, not a genuine social 
norm capable of affecting public behaviour or policy. 
This begs the question of what motivated imperial or (under the 
Republic) senatorial policy regarding loans and debts in general and 
interest rates in particular. It seems that if any policy existed, it was limited 
to preserving the public interest in times of crisis. In other words: what 
motivated policy-makers was not the ill odour surrounding faeneratio, but 
simply the Res Publica and – when called for – crisis-management. 
The potential of endowments as a structural source of credit in the 
ancient world has been receiving attention from scholars since a few years. 
Jinyu Liu’s paper on the endowments given to private associations is a 
valuable contribution to this debate. Liu surveys various ways in which the 
collegia benefited from the endowments they received and how the 
management of the endowments changed the way collegia were organised 
and functioned. Over the course of second century AD (although 
occasional endowments are attested already in the first century) 
endowments to collegia increased, so that in time the collegia became 
major players in local credit markets.  
Liu suggests that the appeal exerted by associations of craftsmen and 
tradesmen may be explained (at least in part) by the favourable conditions 
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under which they could borrow money from the endowments managed by 
the association. If this hypothesis is correct, it would imply that the 
collegia were a powerful generator of productive or commercial credit on a 
socially ‘low’ level. 
There is still some disagreement on the legal status of private 
associations, regarding the question of whether any collegium licenced 
under the terms of the lex Iulia de collegiis enjoyed corporate capacity or 
not, but the Digest in any case shows increased imperial intervention in the 
2nd century. This should be reconsidered in the light of Liu’s (and other 
scholars’) studies on the collegia as credit providers and endowment 
holders. 
Similar suggestions have recently been made by Mrozek in connection 
with endowments entrusted to cities2. Mrozek believes that these served 
primarily to finance the evergetism expected from civic elites. Municipal 
aristocrats had the landed estates to provide security and controlled the 
funds in questions, because they provided the cities’ financial magistrates 
and curatores, and they filled in the local senates.  
Mrozek’s thesis hasn’t been discussed by any of the authors here, but it 
deserves to be linked to Liu’s thesis because together they would signify a 
revolutionary development in the credit economy in the second century 
AD. Even if the majority of the funds were not readily available for 
productive purposes (contrary to Liu’s idea), the endowment based credit 
facilities would have freed enormous sums that would otherwise not (or 
only in part) have been available for loans.  
The growth of the ‘endowment-economy’ raises questions concerning 
the role of bankers and credit intermediaries. How did they react to the 
emergence of an alternative credit market ? Were they involved in the 
management of the funds ? Unfortunately, as Liu rightly notes, our sources 
are largely mute on this subject. But the questions have to be posed and if 
rightly formulated may shed some light on hitherto neglected data. For 
instance, from legal sources it appears that Septimius Severus and 
Caracalla introduced some fundamental reforms to the legal framework for 
money-lending concerning the enforcement of legal interest rates and the 
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use of unenforceable pacta conventa3. Are these in some way related to the 
growth of the endowments and the way they were managed ? 
Marta García Morcillo’s paper studies a hitherto mostly neglected 
function of Roman bankers : their contribution to the imperial tax system. 
The lex metalli Vipascensis and the tablets of Caecilius Iucundus show that 
the auction taxes instituted by Augustus – the centesima auctionis (1% on 
all auction sales) and the quinta et vicesima venalium mancipiorum (4% on 
the sale of slaves) – were deducted by the coactor argentarius from the 
sum he paid out to the seller, and paid out to the tax farmer who had 
bought the tax revenues. These taxes were vitally important because (since 
6 AD) they constituted one of the main revenues for the aerarium militare. 
Greek bankers (including in Ptolemaic Egypt) never appear to have been 
involved in the organisation of auctions or have provided short term credit 
at auctions. However, Egyptian papyri attest the appearance of komaktores 
in the time of Augustus, who were involved in the organisation of auctions 
and had to pay a tax called komaktoria. The idea that the institution of the 
centesima auctionis was inspired by Ptolemaic examples is not new, but 
Garcia Morcillo shows that the introduction of komaktores – the equivalent 
of the Roman coactores – in Egypt and possibly elsewhere was inspired by 
Roman examples and reflected the key position assigned to coactores in 
the levy of the auction taxes.  
Auctions are also the subject of Aldo Petrucci’s paper, but seen from a 
legal angle. Petrucci analyses the various contractual arrangements and 
obligations arising when an argentarius organizes an auction. At the heart 
of the arrangement are the stipulatio by which the argentarius promises 
the vendor (the dominus auctionis) to pay him/her the proceeds of the 
auction and the stipulationes by which the buyers promise the banker to 
pay him the price they had bid. The banker’s obligation towards the vendor 
is independent from the obligations incurred by the buyers. If the latter 
default, the banker may sue them on the grounds of their stipulatio to him, 
but his own liability to the dominus auctionis is not affected by this.  
Petrucci argues that in addition to the stipulatio the argentarius also 
entered into a services contract (locatio conductio operum) with the 
vendor, for which he received a fee (merces) that was deducted from the 
sum he paid over to the latter.  
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There is an obvious advantage to this arrangement for the dominus 
auctionis, because the banker assumes both the practical burden of 
organizing the auction and the greater part of the risk involved in the 
operation. The banker is rewarded by the fee he receives from the dominus 
auctionis and the interest he charges to the purchasers if they prefer to buy 
on a credit basis rather than pay pecunia praesenti. 
But there is also a risk for the dominus auctionis: what if the banker 
defaults? Will he then be able to sue the buyers for his money on the basis 
of the obligations resulting from the sales arrangement ? Petrucci argues 
(persuasively in my view) against the idea that the stipulatio contracted 
between the argentarius and the buyer would extinguish the obligations 
attached to the contract of sale as such (emptio venditio). These only 
extinguished only when the purchaser has paid the agreed price or returned 
the object sold (if there are sufficient grounds for such a return). While 
only the argentarius can avail himself of the actio ex stipulatu against the 
purchaser to obtain redress in case of non-payment, only the dominus 
auctionis, as actual vendor, can avail himself of the actio empti against the 
purchaser. 
The importance of Petrucci’s analysis is that its unravels the web of 
simultaneous contractual obligations surrounding the role of the 
argentarius in auctions. They show how Roman law was complex, flexible 
and – most important of all – effective in creating the necessary conditions 
for the auction-credit system to work. 
Peter Gröschler shows the same refinement and flexibility for the 
contractual securities that Roman law provided to creditors. Depending on 
the specificities of each case, creditors could choose between a variety of 
personal and real securities. In addition to the securities stricto sensu, the 
creditor could demand a stipulatio poenae – establishing a fine for default 
– and/or an oath. Two types of oaths were current: an oath to the gods and 
the deified emperors (usually per Iovem et numina divorum Augustorum) 
and an oath to the genius principis. The latter oath made the perjurer 
criminally liable for crimen laesae maiestatis, the former carried only 
moral and religious sanctions. Gröschler studies how these possibilities 
were put in practice in the tablets of the Sulpician archive. He shows how 
personal securities – mostly by means of fideiussiones – were used when 
the amounts at stake were relatively modest, while real securities were 
preferred in the case of higher amounts. A combination of stipulationes 
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poenae, oaths and personal securities were used when real securities were 
not available. Oaths could also be used to lend extra support to personal 
securities, as documented in the case of a fideiussor swearing that he has 
incurred no other obligations through fideiussio. The only instance of an 
oath per genium principis – in combination with a very high stipulatio 
poenae – relates to a ‘bad’ debt that had long been due.  
Éva Jakab analyses one of the most complicated documents in the 
Sulpician archive, TPSulp. 48. The intention of the legal construct attested 
in this document is clear: C. Iulius Prudus wants to assume all liabilities 
arising from any financial assistance, under whatever form, that Cinnamus 
personally or through others, would give to Prudens’ agents. The difficulty 
is how to interpret the legal means with which the contracting parties 
attempt to achieve this objective. 
The final clause of TPSulp. 48 contains a stipulatio, but the greater part 
of the text is formulated as a subject clause of a rogatum et mandatum. 
Most scholars believe that Prudens’ intention was to give a mandatum 
pecuniae credendae (a personal security given by mandatum) to 
Cinnamus. However the formulation of the text cannot legally support 
such an intention. The conclusion has generally been that the text was 
badly drafted by the scribe who was responsible for registering the cautio. 
I have argued elsewhere (in an unpublished paper) that the mandatum in 
question was a legally valid mandatum pecuniae dandae4, useful to 
neutralize liabilities incurred by Prudens’ agents or third persons acting on 
behalf of his agents. By accepting the mandatum pecuniae dandae, 
Cinnamus (and his heirs) became bound by bona fides to sue (with an actio 
mandati) only Prudens in case of default, not his agents. If Cinnamus 
would take legal action against Prudens’ agents or those acting on their 
behalf, he became liable himself under the terms of the mandatum, while  
Prudens’ agents could invoke an exceptio doli to defend themselves 
against Cinnamus (or his heirs). The arrangement would reinforce 
Prudens’ organization, because it significantly reduced the risks his 
partners, collaborators and agents incurred when working for Prudens. 
These effects could not be accomplished by the stipulatio alone.  
Jakab offers an alternative explanation. In her view the words rogare et 
mandare should not be seen as technical terms referring to the contract of 
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mandate. They are merely an attractive but empty phrase to describe 
Prudens’ position and his intentions underlying his acceptance of the 
stipulatio. Although she does not cite it, Jakab’s interpretation reflects 
Elisabeth Meyer’s fascinating and in many ways ground breaking study of 
the role of tabulae and their highly formulaic and pseudo-archaic style in 
Roman legal practice5. According to Meyer the tabulae and their peculiar 
style serve a semi-ritualistic function that adds legitimacy rather than 
legality to the ‘acts and facts’ recorded in the tabulae. If Jakab is right her 
analyses adds further weight to Meyer’s thesis. 
The three previous contributions illustrate the still not wholly explored 
potential of law studies for the understanding of how the Roman economy 
worked. The past years many efforts have been made to bring the 
historically separated disciplines of Roman Law and Ancient History 
closer together. It is quite remarkable and sad that despite the enormous 
amounts of energy which have been spent on defining the ‘nature’ of 
ancient economies and on construing a theoretical framework fit for 
analyzing them, only a handful of scholars have been attentive to the 
crucial importance of a flexible and efficient legal system for the 
development of markets and market economies. Most economic historians 
stick to general assertions either confirming or rejecting the thesis that 
Roman law provided a useful framework for markets to develop beyond 
the basic level of village or local exchange settings. Happily, this situation 
is slowly changing and the number of economic historical studies relying 
on legal sources and insights of legal historians is increasing.  
What is still lacking, however, is a general theoretical framework 
integrating economic, legal and historical research methods and results. 
One can argue endlessly over the practical importance of theoretical 
models in historical research, but in this case the challenge of integrating 
three widely different research fields (economy, law and history) requires 
that some common intellectual ground be found on which specialists from 
all three disciplines can meet and communicate. This will take time and 
more than likely any ‘common ground’ will prove to need timely updates 
as research results progress, but it is a necessary step if we want to 
progress beyond the level of ‘facet’ studies. 
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Taco Terpstra’s work is a contribution to creating such a common 
ground, using the theoretical framework of institutional economics. His 
study focuses on transaction costs; an economic concept which denotes the 
‘cost’ involved to compensate the uncertainties inherent in the transaction 
process itself. There are ‘search costs’ (indicating the information deficit 
regarding opportunities for exchange), ‘negotiation costs’ (indicating the 
efforts needed to compensate uncertainties between the transaction 
partners), and ‘enforcement costs’ (indicating the efforts needed to force a 
recalcitrant transaction partner to deliver his part of the deal). Terpstra 
shows how the legal technicalities in the tablets of the Sulpicii archive may 
be analyzed from the perspective of institutional economics as effective 
means to lower transaction costs. The Sulpicii archive has the advantage of 
giving us an inside view of how ancient economic actors used legal means 
to cope with the high transaction costs typical of pre-industrial economies. 
If Terpstra’s analysis is correct (as I believe it is), then the Roman legal 
system must be accepted as a highly effective support system for a 
flourishing (albeit pre-modern) market economy, at least in the field of 
financial services. 
Clearly one of the main results of the papers collected here is to give a 
powerful argument for the importance of credit to the Roman economy in 
general in the period from the late Republic to the 3rd century AD. Dominic 
Rathbone’s and Peter Temin’s contribution puts this in a fascinating 
comparative perspective with 18th century England. The authors use this 
perspective to investigate whether differences in scale and organisation of 
financial intermediation help to explain why the Roman economy never 
experienced an industrial revolution.  
In terms of total turnover both in 1st c. AD Roman Italy and in 18th 
century England the scale of credit markets was enormous. Rathbone 
‘guesstimates’ that Pliny the Younger had ca. 5 million sesterces out on 
loan; approximately a quarter to a third of his total fortune. Rathbone 
believes this is a plausible average ratio for senators in general.  
In my view this ratio is too high, but the basic approach of estimating the 
scale of credit markets by using the relatively sound data on senatorial 
fortunes is valid and Rathbone’s conclusions stand even when we 
downscale his figures considerably. 
For instance, the senatorial census of 1,000,000 sesterces implies that the 
600 senators owned patrimonies worth at least 600 million sesterces. Most 
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senators, however, owned substantially more (Cicero and Pliny each 
between 15 to 20 million sesterces) and some, like Seneca, owned vastly 
superior patrimonies worth several hundreds of million sesterces. 
Therefore the total value of senatorial fortunes must be reckoned as at least 
ten times this amount and probably even much more. 
Tacitus informs us that many senators had invested more than a third of 
their wealth in loans. Even if this is exaggerated, it should now be admitted 
that senatorial fortunes typically consisted at least for a substantial part in 
loans. If we assume that the average senator invested only 10% of his 
fortune in interest bearing loans, we still arrive at a total of at least 600 – 
but probably much more – million sesterces out on loan for senators alone. 
To this should be added the debt claims held by knights, local elites, 
business men and others. However great the uncertainty entailed in such 
figures, clearly the total sum of outstanding debts at any moment in the 
Early Empire must be reckoned in terms of many billions of sesterces; no 
doubt more than double the total imperial budget and more than the 2,000 
million sesterces suggested by Rathone for the aggregate value of the 
coinage in circulation. No matter how volatile such figures may be, no one 
can reasonably doubt the huge scale they indicate. 
Who were the actors of this market? Rathbone carefully surveys the 
various kinds of credit mediation, ranging from one-to-one arrangements 
over merchants and associations, trough public institutions and finally 
banks and bankers. The latter receive by far most attention. He argues that 
the financial services offered by bankers stricto sensu were numerous and 
covered very considerable sums.  
Rathbone projects at least a thousand banks in 1st c. AD Rome and Italy, 
realising annual turnovers between 100,000 sesterces (Caecilius Iucundus) 
and 3.3 to 16 million sesterces (Sulpicius Cinnamus). I don’t believe the 
Sulpicii were argentarii and I think that even Rathbone’s lower figure for 
their annual turn-over is too high, but as financial specialists the Sulpicii 
certainly were as ‘professional’ (in an economic sense) as any argentarius 
and even the most pessimistic guesstimate won’t push the lower figure 
down to less than several hundred thousand sesterces – more likely 
between 500,000 and 1 million than between 100,000 and 500,000. 
Clearly also the margins of error involved in Rathbone’s projected figure 
of 1000 banks are huge. For instance, we are informed primarily on Rome, 
Ostia-Portus, Puteoli and Pompeii. At the very best these few cities reflect 
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the situation in Latium and Campania. There is no reason to assume that 
the situation in other regions of Italy was in any way comparable; just as 
the situation in 18th c. London was incomparable to that elsewhere in 
England, where banks for most of the 18th c. hardly existed.  
Nevertheless, even so the total turn-over of the banking sector sensu 
largo (i.e. including non-deposit related financial services as those offered 
by the Sulpicii) in Italy alone must have been closer to 500 million 
sesterces (or more) than to 100 million. Again, therefore, Rathbone’s 
conclusions stand: “even if the modal Roman bank was small, Roman 
banking was big business” and “this was culture of investment, not 
hoarding”. 
One of the major differences between the Roman-Italian credit system 
and that of 18th c. England was that the English Crown – as all European 
governments at the time – relied heavily on loans to finance its policies. 
While government debts remained often dubious investments in the 17th 
century, in the 18th c. they became a normal feature of credit markets, 
which eventually (in 1752) led to the institution of consolidated annuities  
(or ‘consols’), that circulated freely at fluctuating rates on financial 
markets. The existence of this stable low risk perpetual national debt 
profoundly influenced the credit market as a whole. Its absence in Roman 
times, therefore, substantially differentiated the Roman credit market from 
the 18th c. English market. 
Another important feature of the 18 c. English credit market that was 
missing in Rome, was the contribution made by the huge joint stock 
companies that monopolised the Indian trade. Because their shares could 
be bought and sold they could also be used as security for loans, which 
profoundly influenced the credit market.  
A further major difference lay in the availability of financial instruments. 
Rathbone rightly argues that account and paper debt arrangements existed 
and were important in Roman Italy, but there was no equivalent to the 
impersonal bill of exchange in 18th c. England. Temin presents the 
(international) bill of exchange and its variant, the inland bill (for 
transactions within the country) as vital instruments to finance 
international and national trade in 18th c. Europe.  
Both in England and France brokers played an important role as 
mediators for the arrangement of loans. They brought prospective creditors 
and debtors together and negotiated loans and debts. Attorneys and 
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scriveners (in England) and notaries (in France) were the prime categories 
acting as brokers. Private bankers stricto sensu developed into major 
players on the credit market only in London (not in Paris, nor (except for a 
handful of exceptions) in the rest of England until the end of he 18th c.). 
Interestingly the records of Hoare’s bank show that the interest rate at 
which a loan was extended was not recorded in the accounts and can only 
be deduced by comparing the recorded repayment of capital and interest 
when the loan came to an end. It appears that almost all loans were 
extended at the legal maximum rate. 
Both bankers and intermediaries had to respect the usury limit of first 
6%, later 5%, which consequently meant that they had very little 
bargaining margin to adjust interest rates to risks. The result of this was 
that neither brokers nor banks hardly ever financed business ventures 
because of the inevitable risks these involved. Traders had to look for their 
financial needs elsewhere, viz. in bills of exchange. 
The Sulpicii archive – regardless of the discussion regarding their 
identity as bankers of brokers – as well as various data from literary 
sources show that this was not the case in ancient Rome, where even risky 
maritime business operations apparently had little difficulty in obtaining 
loans. The conclusion therefore is somewhat surprising: from a financial 
point of view, the Roman credit system – however profoundly different it 
was – was better able to generate loans financing business ventures, than 
the English system was.  
Koenraad Verboven’s paper, although it disagrees with Rathbone’s 
views on many points, goes in the same direction. Many scholars still 
implicitly take for granted that technically advanced financial services 
were the exclusive domain of deposit bankers (argentarii and nummularii). 
Faeneratores are either seen as unscrupulous mafia-style ‘businessmen’ or 
as pitiable profiteers filling the niches left by professional bankers, 
stewards of aristocratic fortunes and informal credit arrangements by 
members of the elite. 
Against this view, Verboven argues that credit mediation by 
businessmen – faeneratores – was much more professionalised and 
developed than is generally recognised. ‘Professional’ financial 
intermediation was readily available from brokers and intermediaries for 
small and (very) large amounts of money. The non- or minimal 
involvement of deposit bankers in the extension of loans to businessmen, 
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does not imply that the Roman financial system was inherently unsuitable 
to provide productive loans, it is merely a feature of the historically 
specific organisation of Roman credit markets. 
